By Muhammad Arif
In any constitutional democracy, the administration of criminal justice must be premised on fair investigation, impartial adjudication, and protection of fundamental rights. In Pakistan, however, the investigative process is structurally and legally defective ab initio. Entrusting the same police establishment with both investigation and assistance during trial, and more so to the less educated staff, without clear functional separation or legal independence, offends the principles of natural justice, due process, and the rule of law guaranteed under Articles 4, 9, 10A, and 25 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (CrPC), particularly Sections 154 to 173, the police are empowered to register FIRs, investigate cognizable offences, record statements under Section 161, and submit final reports (challans) under Section 173. However, these provisions, originally codified under colonial administrative logic, remain largely unreformed and unsuitable for a modern criminal justice framework. The investigating officer (IO), in staff grades 14–16, typically lacks formal legal education, professional training in forensic investigation, use of modern investigative tools, or exercise of institutional independence. This results in a deeply flawed investigative process, susceptible to extraneous influences, coercion, and procedural lapses that frequently culminate in either wrongful prosecution or acquittal for want of evidence.
The most glaring defect lies in the concentration of both investigative and prosecutorial functions within the same police hierarchy. While Section 156 of the CrPC empowers the police to investigate without prior permission of the Magistrate, there is no statutory provision ensuring that the investigation is insulated from the same administrative command responsible for maintaining law and order, public security, or executing arrests. Consequently, the investigation becomes an instrument of institutional convenience rather than a search for truth. This conflation of roles gravely undermines the objectivity of proceedings under Section 173 CrPC and violates the accused’s right to fair trial as envisaged under Article 10A of the Constitution.
Although the Police Order, 2002, was introduced to modernize and depoliticize policing functions, its promise remains largely unrealized. Chapter IV of the Police Order envisages the separation of investigation from other policing functions, a reform mandated under Article 18, which states that “Investigation shall be conducted by an officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector who shall not be responsible for law and order functions.”
Moreover, investigation reports—often carelessly or maliciously drafted—are riddled with procedural irregularities. Confessional statements extracted under duress, manipulation of witness testimonies, tampering of evidence, and violation of mandatory timelines reflect a systemic collapse of the investigative discipline. In numerous reported judgments, superior courts have censured the police for defective investigations, including the failure to observe the statutory duties imposed under CrPC Section 157 (duty to send a report to the Magistrate), and the non-compliance with the requirements of CrPC Section 174 in cases of unnatural deaths. These shortcomings not only impair the administration of justice but render the criminal process arbitrary and legally unsustainable.
An additional concern is the lack of independence and accountability of investigating officers. In practice, police investigations are frequently subjected to political interference, departmental pressure, or local influence. Transfers of honest officers, withholding of promotions, or initiation of disciplinary proceedings are commonly used tools to manipulate the course of investigation. Such practices violate the constitutional mandate of equality before law (Article 25 of Constitution), and often result in miscarriage of justice, with the actual perpetrators shielded and innocent individuals framed.
Compounding the problem is the absence of minimum legal qualifications for investigators —who must possess law degrees and relevant experience whereas current Investing Officers possess no relevant law degrees and advanc ed investgiative knowledge. This glaring anomaly leads to a paradox where the most critical stage of the criminal process is executed by personnel untrained in evidentiary standards, procedural safeguards, or constitutional protections. It is imperative that investigations into serious offences be conducted only by Legal Officers of the level of a Civil Judge, possessing accredited legal education, selected through a transparent and competitive process. This measure would help professionalize the investigative apparatus and reduce dependency on coercive methods or fabricated evidence.
Furthermore, the failure to utilize modern forensic tools, digital evidence protocols, and scientific investigation techniques continues to handicap the system. Despite the existence of state-of-the-art forensic science facilities, most IOs lack the training or initiative to incorporate forensic corroboration into their findings. This reliance on oral testimony, confessions in custody, or compromised witness accounts is contrary to the evidentiary principles codified under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and is frequently discredited in courts due to lack of credibility.
To remedy these foundational defects, a comprehensive overhaul of the investigation regime is warranted. First, the function of investigation must be institutionally separated from other police responsibilities, through a dedicated and independent Directorate of Investigation, in true implementation of Articles 18–20 of the Police Order, 2002. Second, the CrPC must be amended to prescribe legal qualifications, minimum service grades, and professional training standards for investigating officers. Third, judicial oversight mechanisms under Chapter XIV of the CrPC must be reinforced by mandating periodic review of investigation reports by Magistrates empowered under Section 190. Fourth, accountability mechanisms must be instituted to penalize deliberate misconduct, procedural abuse, or wilful negligence during investigation. Fifth, Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) of Investigation Officers must be aligned with the quality of their work, including the conviction rate of cases as upheld by trial courts. Where courts identify material defects, procedural violations, or fabricated evidence, such findings should be recorded in the officer’s service dossier. Performance evaluation must be based not on the volume of FIRs or arrests but on legally sustainable, professionally investigated cases resulting in fair adjudication.
Finally, if Pakistan genuinely seeks to uphold the rule of law, protect the basic human rights of its citizens, and restore the credibility of its legal institutions, reforming the investigation system must be recognized as an urgent constitutional and legal imperative. The protection of life and liberty under Article 9, the right to fair trial under Article 10A, and equal protection under Article 25 cannot be meaningfully realised unless the investigative process itself is restructured on the touchstones of professionalism, legality, and independence.
Justice, in its truest form, demands that every citizen is investigated fairly, prosecuted lawfully, and tried impartially. That journey must begin by correcting a system that has remained defective from inception. Until then, Pakistan’s criminal investigation system will remain not only inadequate—it will remain irredeemably flawed as it has been ab initio.
Justice, if it is to be real and lasting, must be built upon an investigation system that is professional, independent, legally sound, and accountable. That requires radical change—not incremental fixes. The system must be dismantled where broken and rebuilt with integrity at its core.
Until then, crimes in Pakistan will keep increasing in heaps and bounds only because of baseless and intentionally defective FIRs and flawed and manipulated investigations.
The writer is a lawyer, former Member (Gas), OGRA, and Managing Partner at Arif and Associates, a full-cycle law firm specializing in energy law with passion in governance, consumer and human rights advocacy. He can be reached at [email protected]
