The May 7 India-Pakistan air conflict may represent a “watershed” event for both countries and the entire South Asian geopolitical landscape. Following its aerial victory, Pakistan’s international environment has significantly improved, its international status has notably increased, and its diplomatic space and flexibility have rapidly expanded. Pakistan has seized this favorable opportunity to take proactive measures, continuously introducing new diplomatic initiatives, mainly manifested in four aspects:
First, utilizing Prime Minister Shehbaz’s visit to China to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Tianjin Summit and the “September 3 Military Parade,” Pakistan further strengthens its all-weather strategic partnership with China and consolidates its fundamental external strategic support.
Second, promoting pragmatic cooperation with the United States, including energy and mineral cooperation in Balochistan province and proposing that the two countries cooperate in constructing new ports in Pakistan.
Third, regarding the Middle East, Pakistan openly opposes Israel and the United States’ strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in the “12 Days War” in June, supports the Palestinian people’s struggle against Israel, and signs a joint strategic defense agreement with Saudi Arabia after Israel’s airstrike on Qatar in September.
Fourth, regarding South Asia, apart from continuously updating the international community on its achievements in the May India-Pakistan air conflict and countering India’s bellicose rhetoric, on October 10, Pakistan conducted military strikes against Pakistani Taliban (TTP) and “Baloch Liberation Army” and other extremist organizations within Afghanistan, after which the largest-scale military conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan since 2021 when the Afghan Taliban returned to power erupted.
This series of foreign policy actions leaves one dazzled, even somewhat unexpected, but truly reflects how hard Pakistan’s senior leadership and strategic community have worked to resolve the difficulties and challenges it faces against the backdrop of major global changes.uzb 
Three-fold Internal Challenges
Pakistan currently faces difficulties and challenges mainly concentrated in three areas: First is the security challenge, which is divided into internal and external dimensions. Internal challenges mainly stem from insurgency and separatism in Balochistan province and the TTP, while external challenges mainly come from India and Afghanistan. External security challenges have important implications for internal security challenges. Since independence, India has been Pakistan’s greatest security threat. In May this year, Indian Prime Minister Modi intended to launch a military strike against Pakistan following the April 22 attack in Pahalgam, Indian-controlled Kashmir, to establish a higher level of military deterrence against Pakistan and showcase its “regional hegemony” image to the world, thereby realizing its domestic political objectives and geopolitical ambitions. However, it suffered an unexpected defeat and exposed the military equipment and combat capability gap between itself and Pakistan.
Another external security challenge comes from Afghanistan. Although the Afghan Taliban’s return to Kabul in 2021 had Pakistan’s support, matters subsequently spiraled beyond Pakistan’s control. The traditional border disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan, namely the “Durand Line” dispute, and the issue of Pashtunistan’s affiliation in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas have resurfaced. The Afghan Taliban’s return to Kabul has also incited the TTP to attempt to create a “state within a state” in Pakistani territory, and the blood ties, tribal connections, and religious sentiments between the Afghan Taliban and TTP make the outside world believe that the Afghan Taliban has long been covertly harboring the TTP. After the Afghan Taliban returned to power, terrorist attacks in Pakistan have increased year after year, with attack scale and casualty numbers continuously expanding, and various extremist organizations showing hidden signs of coordination, posing serious threats to Pakistan’s social stability and the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Since the Imran Khan government era, Pakistan has hoped to achieve a strategic transformation from geopolitics to geo-economics, but without a safe and stable domestic and external environment, economic and social development cannot be guaranteed.
Second is the economic challenge. In recent years, under the impact of external factors such as the U.S. Federal Reserve’s interest rate hikes and the Ukraine crisis, Pakistan has faced severe debt crisis. With continuous liquidity support and debt restructuring assistance from countries such as China, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, Pakistan has also obtained International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans and has weathered the most difficult period. However, how to promote economic development and prevent another debt crisis from occurring remains the greatest challenge for the Pakistani government.
Pakistan’s poor economic development is not only due to domestic political instability, regional security situations, and international economic environment but mainly because its economic system has not undergone large-scale reform and lacks endogenous momentum. Since 1958, Pakistan has borrowed from the IMF 24 times, with these funds mainly used to repay past debts and refinance current expenditures rather than investment. Simultaneously, Pakistan’s fiscal and tax system is irrational, with widespread tax evasion, and domestic investment reproduction is severely insufficient. Pakistan’s tax-to-GDP ratio in the 2022-2023 fiscal year was 8.5 percent, far below the 19.8 percent average for the Asia-Pacific region. Currently, the simplest solution should be to expand the tax base. Under pressure from the IMF and World Bank, the Shehbaz government has decided to reform taxation, expand the tax base, increase taxation on salaried workers, and eliminate tax exemptions for other classes. However, this reform seems to carry more symbolic than practical significance. Because reforming the tax system is not only an economic issue but more importantly a political issue—the target of reform is actually the ruling elites themselves, and such inward-looking reforms are difficult to implement.
Finally, there are dilemmas and challenges in partisan politics. If Pakistan cannot alleviate the security and economic challenges it faces, the legitimacy issue of the current governing coalition between the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PMLN) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) will surface. There is opinion within Pakistan that the Sharif family and PMLN, as well as the Bhutto family and PPP, can only represent their family and local interests, not those of the entire people. Backlash against traditional political forces is an almost universal phenomenon in South Asian countries. In the 2018 National Assembly elections, the political landscape dominated by the PMLN and PPP for decades was broken, with the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led by Imran Khan winning. However, in April 2022, Imran Khan was removed from office through a vote of no-confidence, after which family politics returned. The PTI and its supporters were highly dissatisfied. Although under military support, the PMLN and PPP formed a governing coalition, the fact that no party obtained a majority of seats in the February 2024 National Assembly elections indicates that family politics no longer enjoys public favor, and Imran Khan’s supporters still possess considerable political influence.
The Air Victory as a “cardiac stimulant”
Pakistan’s military victory in the May India-Pakistan air conflict has injected a “cardiac stimulant” to alleviate the challenges and difficulties faced by Pakistan’s ruling coalition. This battle effectively safeguarded Pakistan’s national security and bought time for creating a more favorable regional security environment. Simultaneously, this victory is Pakistan’s first major triumph since the partition from India, sweeping away the fear complex dating from the Third India-Pakistan War in 1971, greatly boosting national morale, strengthening national cohesion, and enhancing public trust in and support for the government and military.
However, economic challenges remain severe. Unable to obtain endogenous economic momentum through inward-looking reforms, Pakistan hopes to solve economic development problems by attracting foreign investment. In June 2024, Prime Minister Shehbaz visited China, and China and Pakistan released a joint statement indicating that both sides will, based on achievements in jointly building the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, jointly strive to advance the eight major actions China supports for high-quality Belt and Road cooperation. However, China has concerns about the security and business environment issues the CPEC has faced in Pakistan over the past decade.
In recent years, Shehbaz has frequently visited Middle Eastern countries friendly to Pakistan such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, attempting to convince these countries to help Pakistan escape the economic crisis through bank deposits or investment projects. The Pakistani government promoted a new round of privatization reform in 2024, part of which also targets Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds, hoping Middle Eastern countries will purchase its state-owned assets. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have both given positive commitments, but investments have not materialized as expected, with the fundamental reason being Pakistan’s long-term instability and structural problems troubling Pakistan’s economy.
However, Pakistan’s “moment of glory” in the India-Pakistan air conflict has provided new opportunities for Pakistan to attempt to resolve economic and security challenges through diplomatic maneuvering. First, Pakistan has made progress in its U.S. diplomacy. Trump has long harbored dissatisfaction with India, believing that India is merely using the United States to realize its multipolar world goals, and that the U.S. past policy of elevating India while suppressing Pakistan is unfavorable to its “Indo-Pacific strategy.” Therefore, after returning to the White House, he has been brewing adjustments to U.S. India-Pakistan policy. In the U.S. view, India’s failure in the India-Pakistan air conflict indicates that its strategic value in militarily containing China has substantially diminished. The Modi government has categorically denied Trump’s claim that he personally “successfully mediated” the India-Pakistan conflict, while Pakistan’s gratitude toward Trump presents a stark contrast. Subsequently, Pakistan caters to Trump’s preferences, indicating willingness to cooperate with the United States and the Trump family in energy and mineral development, cryptocurrency, and artificial intelligence, and even expressing willingness to nominate Trump for the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize, which has greatly increased Trump’s favorable impression of Pakistan’s leadership.
Pakistan’s conduct is primarily motivated by three reasons: First, to avoid “taking sides” between China and the United States while not ruling out the possibility of playing a bridge role between the two, as in the 1970s; second, to strengthen its relatively advantageous position amid the complex landscape of great power strategic competition and geopolitical shifts, and to promote great powers to increase investment in Pakistan; third, to obtain IMF and other international financial institution loans by drawing closer to the United States; and fourth, to obtain U.S. support in counter-terrorism and combating separatist forces. In August this year, the U.S. State Department announced designating the Pakistani separatist organization “Baloch Liberation Army” and its affiliated “Majeed Brigade” as “foreign terrorist organizations.” Simultaneously, the Trump administration has substantially reduced tariffs on Pakistan and provided intelligence support to Pakistan during the October Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict.
Second, in the Middle East direction, Pakistan’s achievements in the India-Pakistan air conflict have significantly enhanced its discourse power in the Islamic world, especially with Israel and the U.S. striking Iranian nuclear facilities in June and Israel’s September airstrike on Qatar, Pakistan’s importance to some Middle Eastern countries has further increased. Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries are important sources of energy, loans, and remittances for Pakistan, and Pakistan’s joint strategic defense agreement signed with Saudi Arabia has added insurance to the sustainability of these financial sources while also reminding the United States to pay attention to Pakistan’s interests and role in Middle East issues.
To date, the diplomatic actions Pakistan has taken leveraging the impact of the India-Pakistan air conflict have achieved considerable success, but potential risks also exist. Pakistan’s current strategy is to attempt to transform great power competition and geopolitical shifts into driving force for improving its strategic position, enhancing its strategic value, expanding its diplomatic space, and economic interests. Whether this objective can be achieved depends on Pakistan’s political wisdom and diplomatic skills.
(The author is: A Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for South Asia Studies of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies.)
