The federal administration’s decision to impose mandatory E-Tags on all vehicles entering Islamabad is yet another instance where governance in Pakistan seeks convenience for the state rather than service for the citizens. The measure is being promoted in the name of “security,” yet it risks creating new security vulnerabilities rather than addressing existing ones. By forcing vehicles to slow down or queue under fixed cameras, the system unintentionally creates choke points—turning commuters into stationary targets. Instead of enhancing safety, the E-Tag regime manufactures risk, inconvenience, and resentment. This is not reform; it is governance failure or administrative capture, once again.
The policy is fundamentally unnecessary because Islamabad already possesses the infrastructure required to monitor vehicles effectively. The Safe City Project—established at massive public cost—has high-resolution cameras, Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR), facial recognition software, real-time tracking, and centralized monitoring. The system already issues e-challans based on number-plate data without needing additional stickers. Every vehicle entering or moving within Islamabad is captured digitally, making the creation of a parallel tagging regime redundant. If the administration simply ensured the Safe City Project was fully functional, upgraded malfunctioning components, and restored full coverage, every objective claimed for the E-Tag system would already be met—without charging citizens an extra rupee.
Muhammad Arif
The real question, therefore, is not technological, but political. Why introduce a brand-new, billion-rupee system when an advanced one already exists? The answer lies in a familiar pattern of governance. Just as witnessed in recent projects like Serena Chowk and the ongoing Katchery Chowk overhead project, authorities often prefer launching new, capital-intensive initiatives instead of repairing existing systems. In those cases, instead of addressing root causes—poor planning, lack of discipline, weak enforcement—the state opted for large construction projects that created chaos, prolonged traffic misery, and cost billions. The public bore the burden while contractors benefited. The E-Tag scheme follows the same script: reinventing the wheel, making it worse, and enriching intermediaries along the way.
This trend reflects a deeper governance malaise. Large projects create large contracts, and large contracts create large commissions. This political economy of public inconvenience means inefficiency is not an accident—it is often manufactured to justify new spending. Rather than fixing what exists, the system gravitates toward fresh procurements because they offer new opportunities for extraction.
Even the administration’s stated justification—security—falls apart under scrutiny. Islamabad is one of the most heavily monitored capitals in South Asia, with overlapping law-enforcement agencies, check posts, intelligence units, ANPR-enabled cameras, and surveillance grids. If breaches still occur, the cause is not the absence of vehicle stickers but internal failures: weak intelligence sharing, outdated operating protocols, inattentive monitoring staff, and breakdowns in coordination. Each time a security incident occurs—whether a threat alert, law-and-order issue, or suicide attempt—the authorities respond by burdening citizens rather than examining their own institutional weaknesses.
This governance mindset punishes the public for the system’s own deficiencies. Instead of improving internal efficiency and oversight, the administration finds it easier to tighten restrictions on citizens—students, workers, patients, traders—who must now navigate extra steps, queues, and payments simply to enter their own capital city. Treating the citizenry as suspects and revenue sources, rather than as stakeholders, undermines the legitimacy of governance and deepens public frustration.
Logical contradictions further weaken the credibility of the E-Tag proposal. How is a visitor from Sindh, Balochistan, or South Punjab—coming to Islamabad for a one-day appointment, embassy interview, or medical treatment—expected to first obtain an E-Tag? Will such individuals be turned back at city limits? What about ambulances or emergency travelers? The idea is impractical and discriminatory. Similarly, the scheme does not distinguish between vehicles registered in Islamabad—whose data is already fully integrated into the Safe City system—and those from outside. Forcing Islamabad-registered vehicles to obtain a new sticker despite complete digital traceability is illogical.
Moreover, the proposed “E-Tags” do not have dedicated “E-Gates”, entry points, fixed lanes, or corresponding physical infrastructure. Without actual gates or controlled access nodes, E-Tags serve no operational purpose. It is equivalent to setting up a toll plaza without barriers and expecting people to pay. It raises the same concern as other recent development fiascos: the state is investing in structures that are conceptually flawed and technically non-functional but financially lucrative for contractors.
Meanwhile, Islamabad’s residents continue to endure chronic governance failures: unplanned road closures, arbitrary VIP stoppages, chaotic construction, inefficient public transport, and zero traffic discipline. Instead of addressing these pressing issues, authorities have chosen to add another layer of inconvenience, confusion, and cost—while offering no measurable improvement in public safety.
The claim that E-Tags will deter terrorists or criminals is equally unconvincing. Those who intend to commit harm do not register for stickers, drive with original plates, or use main entry routes. Criminals rely on stolen vehicles, forged plates, or alternative access paths. It is the law-abiding public that ends up trapped in queues, interrogations, and bureaucratic procedures.
The Safe City Project, once envisioned as a cutting-edge solution for urban policing and modern security management, is now being undermined by the introduction of a redundant parallel system. Duplication wastes money, creates confusion, and erodes public trust. Citizens already paid for Safe City through taxes; now they are being made to pay again for a substitute system that adds neither value nor security. It is wasteful, unethical, and emblematic of a state that prefers optics over substance.
If the government is genuinely committed to strengthening security, its priorities should be clear: (i) Repair and upgrade the Safe City infrastructure; (ii) Replace outdated servers and malfunctioning cameras; (iii) Improve intelligence coordination and training; (iv) Enforce traffic discipline rigorously; (v) Stop VIP movements that routinely paralyze the city; (vi) Audit internal failures rather than externalizing blame.
These steps would produce tangible improvements without burdening the public. But they lack the glamour—and the financial opportunities—of a new procurement drive.
The E-Tag scheme exposes a systemic governance disease: the relentless urge to build parallel systems, impose new costs, and expand administrative control, while ignoring existing capabilities that work. Islamabad does not need E-Tags; it needs functioning institutions, discipline, transparency, and intelligent governance.
E-Tags add nothing but cost—to the exchequer, to commuters, and to citizens’ dignity. They are not a security solution; they are a potential security threat. Long queues beneath fixed cameras create choke points that put lives at risk. Instead of solving problems, the policy manufactures new ones. To say the least, the E-Tag initiative is not a step toward safer governance—it is a step backward, another example of governance gone wrong. (Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect WNAM’s editorial policy)
The author is former Member (Gas), OGRA; Managing Partner at Arif & Associates, a boutique petroleum and business-law consultancy; and a thought leader in energy, governance, regulatory reform, and consumer rights. Email: [email protected] | Cell: 0333 5191381.
