– The author is the director of the European Neighbourhood Council.
This past week marked a turning point in US-Ukraine relations, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy openly confronted US hypocrisies in the Oval Office. Ukraine lost a preliminary mineral agreement and hopes of immediate US security guarantees. The televised meltdown will go down in history as a defining moment of the transatlantic split.
EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, a traditionally strong ally of Washington, expressed concerns on social media this weekend, stating: “It became clear that the free world needs a new leader. It’s up to us, Europeans, to take this challenge.”
Meanwhile, European diplomats privately voiced deeper anxieties over the situation. An EU officer said: “First you arm them, then you abandon them. Who still believes in American security guarantees?” Echoing similar worries, a Turkish diplomat noted: “A collapsing Ukraine is against our security interests in the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Syria, and Central Asia.”
US strategy strengthens Russia’s position
A weakened Ukrainian leadership would significantly strengthen Russia’s position, with potential geopolitical consequences for countries ranging from Türkiye and Finland to France and Poland, according to many analysts. When trying to predict an adversary, it is important to put yourself in their shoes. Moscow perceives the past four decades as “active aggression against Russia and the Soviet Union.” It blames NATO and much of Eastern Europe. Since the election of US President Donald Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin likely feels empowered and vindictive.
Some have interpreted the new rapprochement as Trump’s idea. That’s misleading. It’s the new administration’s strategy to alienate China by driving a wedge between Beijing and Moscow. Russia is allowed to regain some power, while keeping limited “spheres of influence” in for example Central Asia and the Caucasus — primarily at the expense of Türkiye. Its chances of success are debatable, but the “reverse Kissinger doctrine” is well-documented.
Supporting Russia, however, also serves another purpose. Trump uses it to re-bargain other interests in Europe. The logic is simple: Russia poses a threat, and Washington conveniently holds the proverbial “keys to fix the problem.” In terms of bargaining power, it could not get any better for Trump. Trump strengthens Putin’s geopolitical leverage while renegotiating with European leaders individually, securing American business, technology, and fossil fuel interests. It remains unclear what Washington is willing to offer in return, if anything. But it is safe to say that US-backed financial support to Ukraine is off the table. For the United States, the goal is most likely to cut spending (e.g. US budget) and focus on its own priority, China, while threatening others in Europe with higher tariffs and lower intel-military sharing. In return, he expects support for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and distancing from China, while opening up markets to fossil fuels, big-tech, and defense.
But how sustainable is Washington’s strategy?
According to Lili Pike, a staff writer covering China for foreign policy: “In the wake of Trump’s wrecking ball, China is now probing opportunities to build its own united front with Europe.” One example could be that Beijing holds back on dual-use exports to Russia in order to counter Washington’s rapprochement with Moscow. This will make it more difficult for Trump to ask Europeans to support a future trade war with China.
While Trump publicly confronts Zelenskyy, France is actively forging new security agreements with other nations. Quadri-lateral intelligence sharing is growing and a new defense commissioner has been tasked with European military procurement. In tandem, President Emmanuel Macron and Germany’s newly elected Chancellor Friedrich Merz are discussing industrial coordination, extending French nuclear deterrence and issuing Eurobonds.
The new Franco-German alliance will – inevitably – take into account Türkiye. Despite deep divisions between Paris and Ankara, the reality remains that Türkiye is a major trade partner and Europe’s first supply-chain hub for industrial manufacturing, specific minerals and energy transit. It is also unimaginable for Ankara to disengage from the Franco-German alliance, since over 40% of Turkish trade goes directly into the EU, as opposed to for example 5% US-trade and 11% Russia-trade.
What about Ukraine?
After a first meeting in Riyadh, last week saw Istanbul host the US-Russia follow-up meeting. Both meetings allowed for technical exchanges about normalization and embassies being reopened. Türkiye has long positioned itself as a neutral player in the Ukraine peace talks. It appears that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has successfully leveraged Türkiye’s geo-strategic position and personal relations with all three leaders: Trump, Putin, and Zelenskyy. Ankara is willing to provide boots on the ground in Ukraine: a compromise which could heighten Türkiye’s status across Europe. Both Russia and Ukraine may consider this option — contingent on US endorsement. But whether Poland, France, and the Nordics are as easily convinced or not, remains to be seen.
The inclusion of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan at Sunday’s London Summit is very reassuring. It represents the natural inclusion of Ankara, an EU candidate and NATO’s second-largest army, at the table of European security leaders. Whether Britain, France, Germany, and Türkiye have the foresight to properly coordinate remains to be seen. It would undoubtedly benefit Ukraine, as well as geo-economic stability across the continent. Courtesy: Anadolu News
